Sidgwick’s Dualism Revisited (draft available)

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This paper argues that if there exist a dualism between reasons of prudence and moral reasons, it is not confined to a conflict between what we owe to others versus what we owe to ourselves.

 

Blaming Good People (with Alexander Velichkov, draft available)

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In this paper, we argue that non-moral blame, i.e., blame for non-moral failures, is never fitting or morally permissible.

 

Why We Cannot Gnostically Wrong (with Samuel Carlsson Tjernström, draft available)

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In this paper, we argue that while we can wrong others with our beliefs, we cannot similarly wrong others with the knowledge we have about them.

 

The Emotion of Joy (draft available)

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This paper provides the first thorough philosophical exploration of the emotion of joy and argues that joy is, in many respects, similar to gratitude.

 

Doing it for the plot (draft available)

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This paper argues that the « shape » of one’s life story matters for one’s well-being and argues, against narrativists, that it is sometimes good to do things that completely disrupt the narrative arc of one’s life

 

In preparation

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Grieving possibilities and possible selves

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This paper argues that there exist a kind of parasocial grief that takes, as its object, the disappearance of a possible future and the person we could have been rather than the death of a loved one.

 

Descartes' “Morale par provision”

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This paper argues that the notion of a “morale par provision” has been a relatively neglected aspect of Descarte’s work and shows how it can shed light on contemporary debates on morality under conditions of uncertainty.

 

Moral Responsibility for Emotions

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This paper raises the question whether we can be responsible for our emotions by drawing a parallel with recent discussions on responsibility for belief. It argues that reaching responsibility verdicts when it comes to emotions is tricky because of the link emotions bear to their cognitive bases.

 

Kant on Mental Wrongs

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This paper explores the way Kant’s moral philosophy, both his view on duties to the self and his doctrine of the end versus mean can help us shed light on widespread intuitions according to which it is morally wrong to fantasize about inflicting degrading treatments to others.

 

 

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